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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated children’s social learning of prosocial behaviors in a transgressor 
context. Two-to three-year-olds (24-47 months, N = 54) saw videos of an adult help another 
adult in distress by performing a novel prosocial action. Children were then led to believe that 
they had transgressed to cause their parent’s pain and sadness. It was hypothesized that children 
in the experimental condition who watched the video and then transgressed would be more likely 
to perform the novel action (imitation) and to display non-demonstrated prosocial behaviors 
(goal emulation) relative to children in two control conditions: (a) children who did not view the 
video but transgressed and (b) children who viewed the video but witnessed a neutral interaction. 
Children in the experimental condition were no more likely to imitate or emulate than children in 
the control conditions, suggesting that children have difficulty applying socially learned 
prosocial behaviors in a transgressor context. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Early childhood is a crucial period for developing the ability to recognize and respond 
adaptively to distress in others (Hay & Cook, 2007). Learning to behave prosocially is an 
important skill for young children to master, as these behaviors have been linked to competence 
in domains such as peer relationships and academic achievement (Denham & Holt, 1993; 
Eisenberg, Fabes, Karbon, et al., 1996; Warden & MacKinnon, 2003; Zahn-Waxler & Van 
Hulle, 2011) and are protective against later externalizing problems (Hastings, Zahn-Waxler, 
Robinson, Usher, & Bridges, 2000). Imitation and goal emulation are well-established social 
learning mechanisms through which toddlers learn new skills and connect socially with others 
(Over & Carpenter, 2012). Our previous work demonstrated that toddlers are able to learn a 
specific prosocial behavior and apply this behavior to help a parent in distress through imitation 
and goal emulation (Williamson, Donohue, & Tully, 2013). The purpose of the present study is 
to extend this research to children’s social learning of a reparative prosocial behavior when the 
children believe they have transgressed to cause their parent’s distress.  
1.1 The Development of Empathy and Prosocial Behaviors in Early Childhood 
Prosocial behaviors are voluntary actions that are helpful, affiliative, supportive and 
aimed at benefitting another person, such as comforting another in distress (Eisenberg & Fabes, 
1998). Empathy is an affective response stemming from the apprehension or understanding of 
another’s emotional state, and is similar to what the other person is thought to be feeling 
(Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Sadovsky, 2006). Empathy often motivates prosocial behaviors, but 
prosocial behaviors can occur without empathy and empathy does not always lead to prosocial 
behaviors (Eisenberg & Eggum, 2008). While empathy and prosocial behaviors are related 
constructs that can be distinguished conceptually, they are practically difficult to distinguish in 
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research contexts using behavioral paradigms. 
Evidence that newborns respond to other infants’ distress with contagious crying suggests 
a biological predisposition for empathy that is characterized by self-distress in early infancy 
(Dondi, Simion, & Caltran, 1999; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976). By 6 months of age, infants rarely 
respond to others’ distress with self-distress (Hay, Nash, & Pedersen, 1981; Roth-Hanania, 
Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011), and instead look at or contact distressed peers, displaying 
other-oriented empathic concern (Hay et al., 1981). In one study, 8-month-olds responded to 
others’ distress with concerned affect and attempts to understand the distress (e.g., by using 
vocalizations with a questioning tone); these displays of empathic concern increased over 8 to 16 
months (Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). By toddlerhood, children frequently display emotional 
reactions indicative of empathy, such as facial, vocal and postural expressions of concern for 
victims of distress as well as concerned awareness of the victim (e.g., stopping activity and 
staring at the distressed, Spinrad & Stifter, 2006). Empathy continues to increase with age 
throughout childhood, aided by developments of children’s perspective taking skills, theory of 
mind, and understanding of increasingly complex emotions (Eisenberg & Eggum, 2008; 
Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). 
Prosocial action involves initiating other-oriented behavior, which requires considerable 
self-regulation (Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). Throughout the second year of life, children’s 
empathic concern becomes increasingly accompanied by prosocial behaviors directed toward 
victims of distress—both distress children have witnessed as bystanders as well as distress they 
have caused as transgressors (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & King, 1979; Zahn-Waxler, 
Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). Such behaviors include physical affection, helping 
(e.g., retrieving a bandaid), comforting statements, and apologies. Prosocial responses to distress 
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witnessed as a bystander are termed relationship-enhancing, or altruistic prosocial behaviors, as 
they function to promote or sustain relationships, whereas responses to distress caused as a 
transgressor are termed relationship-mending or reparative prosocial behaviors, as they function 
to repair or restore relationships (Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1998). Further, while 
empathy typically underlies altruistic behaviors, reparative behaviors are often motivated by 
interpersonal guilt, in which a child experiences empathy and an awareness of responsibility for 
the distress (Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990). 
As toddlers learn social rules that guide behavior and become increasingly sensitive to 
situations in which prosocial behaviors are needed and desired, these behaviors in turn become 
more selective (for review, see: Hay & Cook, 2007). Over time, toddlers also gradually need less 
explicit distress cues in order to help victims, an ability that is likely due to parallel 
developments in understanding others’ internal states (Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010). 
This project focuses on 2-and 3-year-olds, as toddlerhood is a period of marked prosocial 
development, and children’s emerging sensitivity to social rules governing behavior may 
facilitate their ability to learn prosocial behaviors through imitation and goal emulation. Further, 
while the literature on children’s prosocial responses to others’ distress has largely focused on 
responses to others’ pain (Brownell, Svetlova, Anderson, Nichols, & Drummond, 2013), the 
current study examines children’s social learning of prosocial behaviors to help another in pain 
and sadness.  
1.2 The Socialization of Prosocial Behavior in Children 
While it is well-established that learning to behave prosocially has implications for 
healthy development and that toddlers are capable of prosocial action, less is known about 
mechanisms that underlie prosocial learning. Children’s prosocial development is influenced by 
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various factors, including personal characteristics of the child (e.g., temperament and empathic 
tendencies, Young, Fox, & Zahn-Waxler, 1999) as well as socialization practices, which are the 
focus of the current study. Although associations between various socialization practices and 
prosocial development are well-documented, this literature is largely correlational, and very few 
studies have examined practices that are associated with the development of specifically 
reparative prosocial behaviors. Our previous study, one of the few experimental investigations of 
the role of socialization practices in the development of prosocial behavior, supports the causal 
role of social learning mechanisms, specifically imitation and goal emulation, in children’s 
acquisition of a specific prosocial behavior that children then applied in a bystander context. The 
current study sought to replicate and extend this finding by examining children’s application of 
socially learned prosocial behaviors in a distinct, developmentally relevant social context – when 
children are transgressors.    
Although prosocial behaviors are influenced by genetic factors, environmental influences 
are particularly influential during early childhood, when both nonshared and shared 
environmental factors exert considerable influence (Knafo & Israel, 2010; Knafo & Plomin, 
2006; Scourfield, John, Martin, & McGuffin, 2004). For instance, one study reported a shared 
environmental effect of .43 and heritability of .22 on toddlers’ helping behaviors when their 
mothers simulated distress (Volbrecht, Lemery-Chalfant, Aksan, Zahn-Waxler, & Goldsmith, 
2007). While individual differences in prosocial responses to others’ distress are evident in 
children as young as 14 months of age (Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 1992) they are not 
stable characteristics until children begin school, at which point they are predictive of later 
prosocial tendencies (Eisenberg et al., 1999; Hay & Pawlby, 2003). Together, these findings 
suggest that the toddlerhood is a prime age at which social mechanisms have influence.  
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Empirical evidence supports the role of socialization in children’s development of 
prosocial behaviors, with studies finding associations between discipline practices, secure 
attachment and emotion teaching and children’s increased prosocial responding. An authoritative 
parenting style has been associated with children’s increased prosocial responding (Hastings, 
Rubin, & DeRose, 2005; Hastings et al., 2000) including greater reparative prosocial behaviors 
(Kochanska, 1991). Prosocial behavior is also associated with inductive reasoning, in which 
parents provide children with explanations about the needs of others and the effects of harmful 
acts (Dlugokinski & Firestone, 1974; Hoffman, 1963). One study found that mothers’ use of 
inductive reasoning at 20-24 months predicted reparative prosocial behaviors 5 months later 
(Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979). 
Moreover, secure early attachment to parents (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Ianotti, 
Cummings, Pierrehumbert, Milano, & Zahn-Waxler, 1992; Kestenbaum, Farber, & Sroufe, 1989; 
Waters, Wippman, & Sroufe, 1979) and teachers (Howes, Matheson, & Hamilton, 1994) and 
mother’s use of emotion socialization practices such as labeling, explaining and discussing 
children’s emotions and supporting emotional expressivity (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Murphy, 1996; 
Eisenberg, Fabes, Schaller, Carlo, & Miller, 1991; Eisenberg, Wolchik, Goldberg, & Engel, 
1992; Garner, 2003) predict children’s increased prosocial responding. One study found that 
parents who more often asked their 18-to 30-month old toddlers to label and explain emotions 
had children who shared and helped more quickly and often than toddlers whose parents elicited 
less of their emotion talk (Brownell et al., 2013). Further, mothers’ responsive, emotionally 
available caregiving in infancy is associated with toddlers’ prosocial responses to distress in 
others (Kiang, Moreno, & Robinson, 2004; Moreno, Klute, & Robinson, 2008; Robinson, Zahn-
Waxler, & Emde, 1994; Spinrad & Stifter, 2006; van der Mark, van IJzendoorn, & Bakermans-
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Kranenburg, 2002; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979). Indeed, in one study, maternal responsiveness at 9 
months predicted prosocial responses to mother’s distress at 22 months (Kochanska, Forman, & 
Coy, 1999). 
While these studies demonstrate that prosocial behaviors are associated with socialization 
experiences even in toddler-age children, the investigations have been almost exclusively 
correlational; thus, it is unclear whether socialization practices play a causal role in prosocial 
development. Alternatively, children’s individual differences in social and emotional 
competence may elicit specialized responses from socialization agents (i.e., parents facilitate 
social interactions for highly social children). A third variable may also mediate the association 
between socialization practices and prosocial behaviors; for example, genes for prosocial traits 
lead parents to facilitate their children’s social development, while these same genes lead 
children to display more prosocial traits. Experimental designs that manipulate the social context 
are necessary to elucidate whether socialization practices cause greater prosocial responding, and 
information about causal mechanisms can inform interventions aimed at increasing prosocial 
behaviors.  
To date, the few experimental studies on socialization practices have focused on direct 
instruction and reinforcement, neither of which appears to effect toddlers’ prosocial responding. 
In one study, neither encouragement from a parent or experimenter nor an experimenter’s direct 
orders increased 24-month-old children’s rates of helping to pick up dropped objects relative to 
children who did not receive instruction (Warneken & Tomasello, 2013). In another study, 
children who initially received praise after helping hand out-of-reach objects to an experimenter 
did not help at a higher rate when the experimenter later needed help than children who had 
initially received neutral feedback after helping; further, children who initially received a reward 
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for helping displayed lower rates of subsequent helping relative to children who had initially 
received praise or neutral feedback (Warneken & Tomasello, 2008). These results suggest that 
children have intrinsic prosocial motivations that can be undermined by extrinsic rewards. 
Modeling of prosocial behaviors by socialization agents may be an effective way to 
socialize these behaviors in toddlers. Socialization agents such as parents, teachers and peers 
may foster a child’s prosocial behaviors by modeling concern for others; children themselves 
may be the recipient of such helpful actions, or children may also learn through witnessing a 
parent or peer model helpfulness toward another child or adult. Studies support that parent and 
peer models are effective in teaching children a wide variety of social skills such as social 
games, positive peer interactions, and initiating social bids (Green et al., 2013; Grosberg & 
Charlop, 2014; Odluyurt, 2013). Further, many of these studies include modeling alone without 
supplementing demonstrations with direct instruction. A naturalistic study found that mothers 
commonly modeled prosocial behaviors toward child victims of distress when in the presence of 
their own children (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979). While this study indicates that mothers 
spontaneously model prosocial behaviors to their children, research that demonstrates a causal 
link between modeling and increased prosocial behaviors in children may inform interventions 
aimed at encouraging parents to add deliberate prosocial demonstrations whenever possible. 
Modeling may be a particularly effective socialization practice for learning a helping 
behavior for several reasons. Since modeling involves demonstration rather than instruction or 
commands, it is unlikely to undermine children’s intrinsic prosocial motivations. Modeling also 
places fewer linguistic demands on toddlers than direct instruction, and, unlike reinforcement, is 
a method of socialization that can be initiated even if a child has no behavioral response to 
witnessing another in distress. Finally, research suggests that children may not act prosocially if 
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they are unsure of what they can do to help (Staub, 1970). Bandura’s self-efficacy theory (1977) 
states that individuals’ self-perceived ability in a situation or domain determines whether they act 
on knowledge that they possess. Modeling prosocial behaviors for children and giving them 
opportunities to replicate the behaviors may equip them with specific strategies they can use to 
help others, enhancing their self-efficacy and thus increasing their prosocial responding when 
they encounter victims of distress. Our previous study supports the causal role of modeling in 
children’s acquisition of a specific prosocial behavior, and identifies specific social learning 
mechanisms, imitation and goal emulation, through which modeling has its effect.  
1.3 Goal Emulation and Imitation in Toddlerhood 
Imitation and goal emulation are powerful social learning mechanisms through which 
children acquire new behaviors (e.g., Want & Harris, 2002). Goal emulation refers to learning 
about a goal that can be met and attempting to meet this goal using unique actions, or means. For 
example, if a toddler witnesses her parent place a blanket over a shivering boy, goal emulation 
would characterize learning if the observing toddler infers that warming the boy is the goal and 
achieves this goal through her own means—handing him a sweater. Imitation is similar to 
mimicry in that both involve reproducing the specific means that a model demonstrated, but 
imitation also involves understanding the goal of these actions. Mimicry would characterize 
learning if the observing toddler copies the witnessed means without recognizing the goal of the 
modeled actions (e.g., copying the action of placing a blanket over a child, but acting on a child 
who is not shivering) while imitation would characterize learning if she recognizes and copies 
both the model’s goal as well as the specific means used to achieve that goal (e.g., she covers the 
boy with a blanket, having inferred that warming is the goal).  
Most research on children’s social learning has not systematically distinguished imitation 
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from goal emulation; instead, many studies attribute any similarity of actions between a model 
and observer to imitation without careful analysis (Want & Harris, 2002). To identify which 
mechanism underlies an instance of social learning, ideal studies have demonstrated means and 
goals that can be distinguished and have presented children with novel tasks so that learning, and 
not prior knowledge of the tasks, can be examined. In two related studies, 12-month-olds 
imitated by reproducing the goal a model demonstrated, turning on a light, using the specific 
means through which the model achieved this goal (often referred to in the literature as target 
acts), touching the light with the head (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Meltzoff, 1988). 
The children looked at the light after they touched it, suggesting that they had learned the 
model’s goal and were thus engaging in imitation, not mimicry (Carpenter et al., 1998). Goal 
emulation is also present in infants (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Huang, Heyes, & 
Charman, 2002; D. E. Thompson & Russell, 2004); in one study, 12-month-olds used their hands 
to achieve a goal instead of a tool that was difficult to use, even after seeing an adult employ the 
tool (Nielsen, 2006). While children are thought to become more imitative than emulative from 
age 2 to 5 years (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009), goal emulation is still 
a prominent mechanism in toddlerhood. One study found that both 23-and 30 month-olds more 
commonly emulated than imitated a series of tool actions by largely performing only actions 
relevant to their goal (McGuigan & Whiten, 2009). While studies have focused on children’s 
social learning of actions on objects, imitation and goal emulation may also be effective means 
for promoting the acquisition of prosocial skills in toddlerhood. 
Imitation is theoretically thought to serve not only an instrumental function of learning, 
for example a new skill or how an object works, but also a social function of identification and 
affiliation (i.e., the observer imitates a model to communicate that he and the model are alike and 
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to attempt to be liked by the model, Over & Carpenter, 2012; Uzgiris, 1981). While researchers 
have traditionally explained children’s imitation in terms of the instrumental function, socially 
based motivations for imitation are increasingly being identified. For instance, 24-month-old 
children were more likely to imitate models who were socially responsive compared to models 
who were unable to provide the child with socially contingent engagement (Nielsen, Simcock, & 
Jenkins, 2008) as well as models with whom they were socially engaged versus those who are 
aloof (Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007; Nielsen, 2006). Moreover, it has been 
proposed that children’s tendency to overimitate, or reproduce a model’s exact means even when 
they do not constitute the most efficient or logical strategy to attain a goal (e.g., Lyons, Young, 
& Keil, 2007) reflects social motivations to identify and affiliate with the model (Over & 
Carpenter, 2012). While imitation clearly serves a social function, none of the reviewed studies 
tested whether children can learn specific social behaviors, such as comforting behaviors, 
through social learning mechanisms. Findings from the current study, which evaluates the role of 
imitation in acquiring such behaviors, may contribute to research on the social functions of 
imitation.  
1.4 Goal Emulation of Prosocial Behaviors in Toddlerhood 
Experimental investigations of children’s social learning of prosocial behaviors have 
largely examined modeling as a means of encouraging the use of previously learned prosocial 
behaviors. Because the models in these studies demonstrated familiar rather than novel prosocial 
behaviors, it is unclear whether learning occurred or whether the example led to prosocial 
responding through processes such as priming or emotion contagion. Further, these studies often 
did not use distinct means and goals, making it difficult to isolate the mechanism through which 
modeling had its effect. Identifying mechanisms underlying prosocial learning could inform the 
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types of demonstrations most likely to increase prosocial responding in children. For example, 
identification of imitation as a mechanism would suggest that very specific behaviors should be 
modeled for use in specific contexts, while pinpointing goal emulation as a mechanism would 
suggest that children can more readily generalize from modeled demonstrations.   
In one study, kindergartners who listened as an experimenter ostensibly helped a child in 
distress were significantly more likely to subsequently help when they heard a distressed child 
than children for whom helping behavior was not modeled (Staub, 1971). In this study, children 
heard an audiotape of a child crying in the next room and were given a “helping” score if they 
went to the room or told the experimenter about the distress; since the design did not involve 
acting on an actual child, it is unknown whether child participants would have imitated the 
model’s exact means (e.g., by replicating the model’s comforting phrases). Similarly, a series of 
studies demonstrated that children donated more winnings from a bowling game to charity if 
they had first witnessed a model donate winnings (Bryan & Walbek, 1970a, 1970b; Grusec & 
Skubiski, 1970; Grusec, 1972; J. P. Rushton, 1975). This effect of modeling on donating 
persisted after an 8-week delay and when children played the game in a different room using a 
different charity box. These effects of durability and generalizability suggest that the results do 
not reflect simple conformity to a model but rather that children internalized the model’s 
behavior. However, it is unclear whether modeling had its effect through imitation or goal 
emulation, since donating represented both the means and the goal.  
Children learn from both live models and video demonstrations (Rushton & Owen, 
1975). A meta-analytic review revealed that children ages 3 to 17 who viewed prosocial content 
in television displayed greater prosocial behaviors than children who viewed neutral, antisocial 
or no television content (Mares & Woodard, 2005). Moreover, supplementing content with 
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prosocial classroom activities had no effect on prosocial outcomes, suggesting that modeling 
alone was sufficient to elicit an effect.  
In summary, extant research addresses whether a model’s example leads to increases in 
children’s prosocial responding of any type (e.g., general nurturing responses). Thus, these 
studies demonstrate prosocial learning through a process akin to goal emulation. Importantly, 
none of these studies examined toddlers, and only our previous study has examined imitation as a 
means of acquiring new prosocial behaviors. 
1.5 Children’s Imitation of Social Behaviors 
While research demonstrates that a model’s example can also influence children’s social 
behaviors through imitation, most studies have investigated imitation of antisocial rather than 
prosocial behaviors (e.g., Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961, 1963a, 1963b). For example, in the 
seminal Bobo doll experiment, children who witnessed an aggressive model displayed more non-
demonstrated physically and verbally aggressive behaviors than children who witnessed a 
nonaggressive model, suggesting that the children emulated the goal of the model’s example; 
further, children who witnessed an aggressive model displayed significantly greater imitation of 
demonstrated physically and verbally aggressive acts (e.g., tossing the doll while saying “Throw 
him in the air”) and nonaggressive verbal responses (e.g., “He sure is a tough fella”) than 
children who did not see a model or saw a nonaggressive model (Bandura et al., 1961).  
Similarly, children may learn specific prosocial behaviors through the mechanism of 
imitation. One study found that 1.5- to 2.5-year-old children of mothers who routinely explained 
the causes of a victim’s distress or addressed the victims were more likely to display altruism 
toward others (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979). While imitation was not tested, the authors note that 
some of the substance of parents’ altruistic actions appeared in their children’s actions (e.g., a 
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child stroked an injured playmate’s hair after witnessing her parent stroke a crying baby’s hair). 
This process appears to describe imitation, since children replicated both the goal that their 
parent demonstrated (relieving another’s distress) as well as the specific means the parent used to 
attain that goal (stroking a victim’s hair).  
1.6 Our Previous Study 
Only our previous experimental study has directly investigated imitation and goal 
emulation as mechanisms through which toddlers learn prosocial behaviors. In this study, 30-
month-olds saw a video of an adult comfort a victim who had bumped her knee by using a novel 
prosocial behavior: patting her head with a mitt (Williamson et al., 2013). Following the video, 
the child’s mother pretended to bump her knee, and children’s helping behaviors were coded 
from video. Children who watched the video and witnessed their mother in distress were more 
likely to display both the novel prosocial behavior (imitation) and other, non-demonstrated 
prosocial behaviors such as hugging (goal emulation) relative to children who did not view the 
video but saw their mother in distress and children who watched the video but saw their mother 
engage in a neutral activity. This study used a novel prosocial demonstration, suggesting that 
children’s use of the new behavior was due to learning rather than previous experience. 
Moreover, because the means and goal were distinct, imitation could be distinguished from goal 
emulation as the social learning mechanism. Finally, children displayed imitation, not mimicry, 
since they replicated the novel behavior only on a distressed parent and not when parents 
engaged in a neutral activity, suggesting that children inferred that the goal of the behavior was 
to relieve distress. 
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1.7 Social Learning of Reparative Prosocial Behaviors 
While our previous study suggests that two-year-olds can learn a prosocial behavior to 
help another in distress through imitation and goal emulation, the current study is the first to 
examine whether children’s social learning of prosocial behaviors extends to a context in which 
children have transgressed to cause another’s distress. It is crucial that children learn to engage in 
reparative prosocial behaviors, as these behaviors repair damage to relationships and prevent 
chronic guilt—a  maladaptive, ongoing condition of feeling guilty beyond the context of a 
transgression (Quiles & Bybee, 1997).  However, evidence suggests that it may be more difficult 
for children to act prosocially toward a victim they have harmed compared to one they have not 
harmed—perhaps partially due to the guilt and shame that transgressions evoke. The current 
study investigated imitation and goal emulation as mechanisms through which children can learn 
to act prosocially in a transgressor context.  
While children typically experience empathy as bystanders and transgressors, they may 
also experience self-conscious emotions such as guilt and shame as transgressors. Guilt is an 
emotion that focuses on negative aspects of a particular wrongdoing whereas shame focuses on 
negative aspects of the self for a wrongdoing (for review, see: Tangney, 1998). Predispositional 
guilt is a tendency to experience guilt in response to a specific event, whereas chronic guilt is an 
ongoing, maladaptive variant of guilt (Bybee & Quiles, 1998). Children as young as two display 
guilt and shame following transgressions (Aksan & Kochanska, 2005; Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & 
Cole, 1993; Barrett, 2005; Garner, 2003; Kochanska, Barry, Jimenez, Hollatz, & Woodard, 2009; 
Kochanska, Forman, Aksan, & Dunbar, 2005; Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 2002). To 
assess guilt and shame, these studies used mishap paradigms in which children are led to believe 
that they have broken an experimenter’s valued possession, and children’s reactions are then 
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coded from videotape. It is theorized that very young children’s affective responses following 
transgression constitute a blend of guilt and shame, which have been operationalized as signals 
of discomfort such as avoidance, tension, arousal, distress, lessened positive affect and increased 
negative affect (Kochanska et al., 2002). Chronic guilt and shame are both associated with 
depression and other symptoms of psychopathology (Harder, Cutler, & Rockart, 1992; Jones & 
Kugler, 1993; Quiles & Bybee, 1997), and chronic guilt is thought to develop when individuals 
cannot engage in reparative behaviors or other actions to alleviate guilty feelings (Bybee & 
Quiles, 1998; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 
1992; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990). Thus, it is crucial that toddlers, who experience self-
conscious emotions after transgressing, learn to alleviate these emotions through engaging in 
reparative behaviors. Even in children as young as three, fewer reparative attempts and chronic 
guilt and shame are associated with greater severity of depressive symptoms (Luby et al., 2009), 
suggesting the importance of learning to engage in reparative behaviors. 
While behaving prosocially after transgressing is critically important, studies suggest that 
children have more difficulty engaging in prosocial behaviors in a transgressor context than in a 
bystander context. Children’s personal responsibility for another’s distress affects their rate of 
prosocial responding, with most studies reporting that children are less prosocial as transgressors 
than as bystanders (Dunn & Brown, 1994; Dunn & Munn, 1986; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979; 
Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, et al., 1992), and only one study finding that children are more 
prosocial as transgressors (Demetriou & Hay, 2004). Studies have documented other important 
differences in prosocial responding depending on whether children were transgressors or 
bystanders, highlighting the distinctiveness of the contexts. In a study conducted by Zahn-
Waxler and colleagues (1992), mothers were trained to observe their 1-to-2 year old toddlers’ 
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responses to others’ distress that children both caused and witnessed. As transgressors, toddlers 
were less likely than bystanders to display empathic concern and engage in hypothesis testing 
about the cause of the victim’s distress and more likely to display self-distress, aggression and 
positive affect. Other studies have found a similar pattern of findings; one study found that 
children more often responded with aggression as transgressors than as bystanders (Demetriou & 
Hay, 2004), and another study found that children less frequently engaged in hypothesis testing 
as transgressors than bystanders (Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1982), possibly indicating that 
they understood that they caused the transgression (Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990). Further, 
one experimental study found that a group of toddlers looked or turned away from the 
experimenter and were slow to attempt reparation after transgressing, demonstrating patterns of 
avoidant behavior in toddlers following a transgression (Barrett et al., 1993). 
It is possible that the distinct emotions that children experience as transgressors (i.e., guilt 
and shame) partially account for why prosocial responding is difficult in a transgressor context. 
While predispositional guilt motivates reparative behaviors, shame is associated with behaviors 
such as withdrawal, avoidance, aggression, denial and fewer reparative behaviors (Tangney, 
1998). Self-conscious emotions can be overwhelming, as they can elicit a high degree of 
affective discomfort and stress response in children (Lewis & Ramsay, 2002). The degree to 
which these emotions are motivating or overwhelming likely depends on which emotion is 
primary, the strength of the emotions, and personal characteristics of the child, such as ability to 
regulate such potentially strong emotions (Lewis & Ramsay, 2002).  
Learning to act prosocially toward a person one has harmed is an important skill to 
master, as reparative behaviors reduce damage to relationships that the transgression has caused 
(Baron, 1990; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989) and alleviate guilt, preventing guilt from 
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becoming chronic (Bybee, Zigler, & Berliner, 1996; Quiles & Bybee, 1997). Thus, learning to 
engage in reparative behaviors in toddlerhood while prosocial abilities are developing has 
implications for healthy relational and psychological functioning. Evidence that children engage 
in less prosocial and more avoidant and aggressive behaviors as transgressors than bystanders 
suggests that prosocial responding is potentially more difficult for children in a transgressor 
context than a bystander context; thus, it is important to investigate imitation and goal emulation 
as mechanisms to increase reparative prosocial responding in this difficult context.  
1.8 Overview of the Current Study and Hypotheses 
In summary, while young children’s prosocial development is associated with 
socialization experiences (Hastings, 2007), few studies have tested causal mechanisms that 
underlie prosocial learning, particularly in a transgressor context. Our previous work suggests 
that imitation and goal emulation are mechanisms through which children can learn prosocial 
behaviors from a model’s example and use them in a bystander context (Williamson et al., 2013). 
The purpose of the current study is to investigate children’s imitation and goal emulation of a 
prosocial behavior when they have transgressed to cause their parent’s distress. The design 
follows that of Williamson et. al, (2013), but was modified by using a transgression paradigm to 
lead children to believe they have caused their parent’s distress, and by adding a trial in which 
parents feign sadness to increase generalizability to other distressing situations. Results will 
inform whether others’ examples can promote children’s reparative prosocial responding in 
transgressor contexts. 
The hypothesis of the current study is that children who watch a video of a model 
demonstrating a novel prosocial behavior will be more likely to perform the novel behavior to 
alleviate their parent’s distress (imitation) and to display other, non-demonstrated prosocial 
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behaviors (goal emulation) relative to (a) children who do not watch the video but see their 
parent in distress and (b) children who watch the video but see their parent engage in a neutral 
activity. Since studies have demonstrated that children engage in spontaneous prosocial 
behaviors in both bystander and transgressor contexts and can imitate and emulate the goal of a 
modeled prosocial behavior in a bystander context, it is expected that children will also be able 
to imitate and emulate the goal of a modeled prosocial behavior when they have transgressed to 
cause their parent’s distress. It is important to test this hypothesis in a transgressor context, given 
the potential interference of guilt and shame in children’s reparative prosocial responding.  
2     METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were a community sample (N=55) of typically developing toddler-aged 
children and their parent. One child with mild Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) was excluded 
from analyses, resulting in a final sample of 54. Children were either two (range = 29.3-33.7 
months; Mage=31.52 months; SD=1.05 months) or three years old (range = 35.1-47.6 months 
Mage=37.85 months; SD=3.22 months). The sample size was selected based on a power analysis. 
Parent-child dyads participated in the current study as part of a larger investigation of young 
children’s imitation. The sample included 29 girls (53.7%) and 44 mothers (81.5%). The 
ethnicity of children was as follows: 76% Caucasian, 15% African-American, and 9% Biracial 
(Caucasian and Asian). The majority of participating parents had at least a college degree (89%).  
Participants were recruited through word of mouth, postings throughout the community 
and on websites frequented by parents of young children, families who had previously 
participated in university studies and agreed to be contacted about additional studies, and the 
Georgia State Infant and Child Subject pool. The subject pool is a database primarily composed 
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of parents of child patients of pediatricians' offices across the Atlanta area. Children were 
included in the subject pool if parents expressed interest in research and consented to be added to 
the database. Research assistants and parents discussed the study over the phone. Interested 
parents were provided with a short description of the study, including required time commitment 
(1 hour). Parents were notified that participation was voluntary, that children and parents would 
be videotaped, and that children would be compensated with a toy worth approximately $10. 
Consent was then obtained from parents to gather demographic information (race/ethnicity, age, 
and gender of children and parents, and parent’s education level) and an appointment was 
scheduled for the parent and child to participate in the study at the Learning & Development Lab 
at Georgia State University. 
2.2 Measures 
2.2.1 My-Child-2 Affective Discomfort Scale (My-Child AD).  
The My-Child-2 questionnaire (Kochanska, DeVet, Goldman, Murray, & Putnam, 1994) 
is a parent-report measure of children’s emotional and behavioral responses to their own 
misbehaviors. Parents rate items on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (extremely untrue, not at all 
characteristic) to 7 (extremely true, very characteristic) of their child. The current study 
examined the 18-item Affective Discomfort after Wrongdoing scale to provide a measure of 
children’s guilt, remorse and other emotional reactions after transgression, mishap or 
wrongdoing. Many of the scale items were modeled after Rothbart’s guilt/shame scale of the 
Children’s Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994). Sample items 
include: “Likely to look remorseful or guilty when caught in the middle of a forbidden activity” 
and “Avoids eye contact if she or he has done something naughty.” Items were summed to create 
a total score. Scores were prorated across the scale so long as less than 25% of items were 
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missing. Questionnaires for two children contained too much missing data to use in analyses. 
The authors report that the scale has good internal consistency and test-retest reliability. The 
internal consistency reliability in the current sample was high (α=.83). Finally, the scale was 
positively correlated with children’s observed behavioral expressions of discomfort after 
wrongdoing in 56-month old children (Kochanska et al., 2002), demonstrating construct validity. 
The scale also demonstrated convergent and discriminant validity in that it was correlated with, 
but distinct from children’s temperamental reactivity (as assessed by the CBQ, Kochanska et al., 
1994), which is a theorized underpinning of children’s affective discomfort after wrongdoing 
(Kochanska, 1991). 
2.3 Experimental Design 
The design was based on that used by Williamson, Donohue, and Tully (2013). Children 
experienced either neutral interactions or pretend transgressions against their parent, depending 
on experimental condition.  
The design of the transgressions was adapted from previous research (Barrett et al., 1993; 
Cole, Barrett, & Zahn-Waxler, 1992; Kochanska, Casey, & Fukumoto, 1995; Kochanska et al., 
2002). Children experienced two trials that differed depending on whether the pretend 
transgression caused the parent’s pain or sadness. While our previous study utilized a pain 
scenario, a sadness scenario was added to the current study to increase the generalizability of the 
findings to other forms of distress.  One other study has examined children’s prosocial responses 
to another’s pain and sadness and found both similarities and differences in children’s responses 
between the two emotional contexts (e.g., children were more prosocial in response to sadness; 
(Bandstra, Chambers, McGrath, & Moore, 2011), suggesting the importance of examining more 
than one emotional context. The order of the trials was counterbalanced. The trials occurred 30 
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minutes apart to decrease the likelihood that the occurrence of two transgressions would appear 
artificial to children. Other studies using a transgression paradigm have included at least two 
mishaps successfully with toddlers (e.g., Cole et al., 1992; Kochanska et al., 1995, 2002). 
Providing more than one opportunity to display learned prosocial behaviors improves validity of 
the measurement, which is particularly important to counter challenges (e.g., distraction) in 
studies of young children.  
2.4 Materials 
2.4.1 Novel prosocial objects. 
The following two objects were each used to demonstrate a novel prosocial act during 
two video vignettes (Figure 1). These unusual objects were chosen as items that children (a) 
would be unlikely to recognize and (b) would not have previously used in a prosocial context: 
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Figure 1. Still photos of the novel prosocial objects: A) cleaning mitt and B) blind duster. 
 
2.4.1.1 Cleaning mitt (A).  
A blue cleaning mitt (24 x 18.5 cm) with multiple 1-inch cloth tentacles covering one 
side. 
2.4.1.2 Blind duster (B).  
A blue blind duster (23 x 8 cm) with a handle on one end and three prongs covered in 
white microfiber on the other end.  
2.4.2 Transgression items. 
The following objects were used to lead children to believe that they had transgressed to 
cause pain or sadness in their parent: 
2.4.2.1 Pounding toy. 
A pounding toy composed of a bench of blocks and a hammer. 
  
A B 
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2.4.2.2 Rigged picture frame. 
A framed photo of a colorful parrot was rigged so that the frame fell apart when handled. 
2.4.3 Demonstration Videos.  
One 45-second video-recorded vignette (presented on a 9-inch screen) was used to 
demonstrate each novel prosocial behavior. The two video demonstrations, rather than live 
presentations, ensured competent acting and uniformity of presentation. Research has 
demonstrated that infants and toddlers can imitate a model’s demonstration presented through 
video (Barr & Hayne, 1999; Hayne, Herbert, & Simcock, 2003).  In both videos, a female actor 
simulates distress and a male actor uses the novel prosocial behavior to help her. The 
demonstrated novel prosocial acts each involve the novel prosocial object and several steps, 
which made the measure more sensitive to subtle individual differences in children’s imitation 
and allowed for establishing clear guidelines for scoring children’s imitation of the acts.  
2.4.3.1 Pain video.  
One video demonstrated a novel prosocial behavior to alleviate physical pain (see 
Williamson et al., 2013). The video begins as Actor 1 bends in pain, demonstrates a distressed 
facial expression and vocal tone and says, “Ow! My finger. It really hurts. Ow.” Actor 1 rubs her 
finger, says “ow” and demonstrates a pained facial expression. Actor 2 then models the target 
acts (prosocial acts): he says, “I’ll help you,” puts the cleaning mitt on his hand, and grasps the 
wrist cuff of the mitt with his other hand. Finally, he leans over and pats Actor 1’s head with the 
mitt four times, first with palm down and then with palm up in an alternating fashion. Actor 2 
says “eee, eee” each time he flips his palm. Actor 1 then recovers by smiling and saying, “I feel 
better now.” 
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2.4.3.2 Sadness video.  
The other video demonstrated relieving sadness. The video begins as Actor 1 points at a 
photo book that has ripped pages, demonstrates a distressed facial expression and vocal tone and 
says, “Oh, no. My book. I’m really sad. Oh, no.” Actor 1 continues to say “oh, no” and 
demonstrate a sad facial expression. Actor 2 then models the target acts (prosocial acts): he says, 
“I’ll help you,” and picks up the blind duster by the white microfiber end with both hands. 
Finally, he runs the blind duster down the arm of Actor 1 four times, first on one arm, then down 
the other in an alternating fashion. Actor 2 says “ahh, ahh” each time he runs the duster down an 
arm. Actor 1 then recovers by smiling and saying, “I feel better now.” 
2.4.4 Scripts.  
Parents used the following scripts in order to feign pain and sadness or interest in objects, 
depending on whether or not their experimental condition included transgressions. Scripts were 
matched for approximate duration, body positions, and vocalizations. 
2.4.4.1 Transgressor scripts. 
2.4.4.1.1 Pain trial 
The parent slipped a finger on top of a block as the child hammered, pretending that the 
child had hammered her finger. The parent bent to rub her finger and feigned distress using facial 
expressions and tone of voice while following a short script: “Ow! You hit my finger. It really 
hurts. Ow.” The parent used a stopwatch and repeated this line after 30s. Then, the experimenter 
re-entered the room, cueing the parent to recover, saying, “I feel better now.” 
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2.4.4.1.2 Sadness trial.   
The parent asked the child to hold the rigged frame. As the parent handed the frame to the 
child, it fell apart. The parent feigned distress using facial expressions and tone of voice while 
following a short script: “Oh, no. You broke my frame. I’m really sad. Oh, no.” The parent used 
a stopwatch and repeated this line after 30s. Then, the experimenter re-entered the room, cueing 
the parent to recover, saying, “I feel better now.” 
2.4.4.2 Neutral scripts.  
2.4.4.2.1 Pain trial.  
The child hammered with the pounding toy and the parent pointed to a hammered block. 
The parent bent to inspect the block and used a neutral tone while following a short script: “Oh. 
Look at this block. Oh look.” The parent used a stopwatch and repeated this line after 30s. The 
parent repeated “oh, look” and continued using a neutral tone and facial expressions. Then, the 
experimenter re-entered the room, cueing the parent to resume normal interactions with the child. 
2.4.4.2.2 Sadness trial 
The parent asked the child to hold the frame. As the parent handed the frame to the child, 
it remained intact. Instead, the parent pointed to the frame and used a neutral tone while 
following a short script: “Oh. Look at my frame. Oh, look.” The parent used a stopwatch and 
repeated this line after 30s. Parents repeated “oh, look” and continued using neutral tone and 
facial expressions. Then, the experimenter re-entered the room, cueing the parent to resume 
normal interactions with the child. 
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2.5 Procedures 
Informed consent, including consent for the session to be videotaped, was obtained from 
parents. Parents were told that they would be able to withdraw themselves and their children 
from the study at any point for any reason, including child distress, without loss of benefits. 
Parents then completed the My-Child AD measure. Parents were then led to the testing room 
with a researcher while another researcher remained with the child in the consent room and 
engaged in a warm-up play period. Parents received training on acting out the appropriate scripts 
(transgressor or neutral) from the experimenter. At this time, parents were warned that crying 
was a possible, albeit uncommon, child response to the transgressor scripts and were again 
reminded that participation in the paradigm was voluntary. The experimenter ensured the 
parent’s understanding of the procedures, and parents were able to refer to written scripts during 
the trials. The remainder of the session was videotaped.  
Parents joined their children in the experimental room and sat in a chair next to their 
child. The first trial (either pain or sadness) occurred as the first paradigm of the lab visit. Each 
trial consisted of several phases (see Trial phases, below). Children in a video condition watched 
a prosocial demonstration video. All children were then given the novel prosocial object to 
examine. Then, parents simulated either a transgression or a neutral interaction with their child 
using either the transgressor or neutral script. Parents answered a follow-up question, and 
children were asked follow-up questions aimed at assessing children’s understanding of fault for 
the transgression or neutral interaction. The larger study procedures then occurred over the next 
45 minutes (e.g., tasks involving children’s source memory, imitation of tool use, and production 
of gestures). Finally, the second trial occurred as the last paradigm of the lab visit. This trial 
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followed an identical sequence as described above. Finally, children in a condition involving the 
transgressor scripts were debriefed, and families left the lab. 
2.5.1 Experimental Conditions.  
Prior to the lab visit, children were assigned to one of three experimental conditions: 
experimental, no-video control, or no-distress control. Restricted random assignment ensured an 
equal number of girls and boys in each condition. Table 1 displays a breakdown of the 
components of each experimental condition. 
Table 1. Components of experimental conditions 
  Transgressor scripts Neutral scripts 
Video 
Demonstration 
Video Experimental No-Distress Control 
No Video No-Video Control N/A 
 
2.5.1.1 Prosocial Demonstration/Transgressor Scripts (Experimental) Condition. 
In this condition, children watched the videos demonstrating the novel prosocial 
behaviors. Parents followed the transgressor scripts. This condition assessed children's imitation 
of the novel prosocial behaviors. 
2.5.1.2 No Demonstration/Transgressor Scripts (No-Video Control) Condition. 
Children in this condition did not watch a video for either trial. Parents followed the 
transgressor scripts. This condition assessed children’s spontaneous prosocial responses and use 
of the cleaning mitt or blind duster when confronted with a distressed parent.  
2.5.1.3 Prosocial Demonstration/Neutral Scripts (No-Distress Control) Condition.  
Children watched the demonstration videos. Parents followed the neutral scripts. This 
condition assessed whether target acts in the experimental condition were produced only for 
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prosocial ends and thus determined whether children’s production of target acts reflected 
imitation or mimicry. 
2.5.2 Trial phases.  
Children in all conditions progressed through the following phases of each trial, with the 
exception that for children in the no-video control condition, the demonstration phase did not 
occur (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Flow chart of trial phases. 
 
2.5.2.1 Demonstration phase.  
Children in a video condition watched the appropriate prosocial demonstration video 
(pain or sadness). 
Demonstration
Phase
Children in a 
video 
condition 
watched the 
appropriate 
prosocial 
demonstration 
video (pain or 
sadness).
Display (of 
prosocial object) 
phase
The experimenter 
placed the 
appropriate novel 
prosocial item 
(cleaning mitt or 
blind duster) in 
front of the child 
for 10s. 
Pretense phase
A pretense phase occured in 
order to set up the basis for the 
events that took place during the 
subsequent test phase.
Pain trial. The experimenter 
handed the parent and child the 
pounding toy. The parent held 
each block in place as the child 
hammered.
Sadness trial. The experimenter 
gave the parent a picture frame as 
a gift. The parent expressed 
happiness for the gift. 
Test phase:
Parents used 
the 
transgressor or 
neutral script 
to simulate 
either a 
transgression 
or neutral 
interaction
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2.5.2.2 Display (of prosocial object) phase. 
The experimenter placed the appropriate novel prosocial object (cleaning mitt or blind 
duster) in front of the child for 10s, giving the child the opportunity to examine the object and 
potentially use it to replicate the demonstrated actions.   
2.5.2.3 Pretense phase. 
A pretense phase occurred in order to set up the basis for the event that took place during the 
subsequent test phase (transgression or neutral interaction). 
2.5.2.3.1 Pain trial 
The experimenter handed the parent and child the pounding toy and said, “you can play with 
this toy for a while.” The parent held each block in place as the child hammered. 
2.5.2.3.2 Sadness trial.  
The experimenter handed the parent a picture frame and said to the parent, “I have this 
present for you for coming in today!” after which the parent held the frame and expressed 
excitement using a short script: “Oh, I love this frame. It’s my new favorite present. It makes me 
happy!” This procedure was used to demonstrate to the child that the frame was of value to the 
parent. The experimenter then took the frame from the parent, telling her that she would put a 
special sticker on the frame. The experimenter switched out the frame for an identical frame that 
now included a sticker. The frame was either rigged (for children in a condition involving the 
transgressor script) or intact (for children in a condition involving the neutral script). The 
experimenter then gave the appropriate frame to the parent.  
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2.5.2.4 Test phase.  
The experimenter left the room, which cued the parent to act out the appropriate script 
(transgressor or neutral). Parents’ initiation of the script denoted the beginning of the 60s test 
phase. The researcher waited outside the door; she began timing when she heard the parent begin 
the script, and re-entered the room after 60s. 
2.5.3 Transgression check follow-up questions.  
The experimenter asked follow-up questions to the child and parent immediately following 
each trial to assess whether children believed that they were responsible for any transgression 
that occurred during the test phase. 
2.5.3.1 Parent ratings of children's perceived fault. 
Parents completed one written question that asked whether they thought their child believed 
the events that occurred during the test phase were his or her fault. Questions were written 
without reference to a transgression so that parents of children in the no-distress control 
condition would be equally able to indicate that they thought their children believed they were at 
fault.  For the pain trial, the question asked: “Do you think your child thought what happened 
with the pounding toy was his/her fault?” For the sadness trial, the question asked, “Do you think 
your child thought what happened with the frame was his/her fault?” Parents responded using a 
four-point scale (0= definitely not, 1= probably not, 2= probably yes, 3= definitely yes). We 
expected that parents of children in a condition that used the transgressor scripts would be 
significantly more likely to rate that their child believed that he/she had transgressed than parents 
of children in the no-distress control condition, supporting the validity of the transgression 
paradigm. 
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2.5.3.2 Children’s report of their perceived fault. 
The experimenter then asked children in all experimental conditions three questions that 
were adopted from other studies that use transgression paradigms (e.g., Kochanska et al., 1995). 
We expected that children in a condition that used the transgressor scripts would be significantly 
more likely to indicate that they were at fault than children in the no-distress control condition, 
further supporting the paradigm’s validity. 
2.5.3.2.1 “What happened” (Narrative question). 
First, the experimenter queried the child, saying “What happened to mom/dad and the 
toy?” and pointed to the pounding toy (pain trial) or “What happened to mom/dad and the frame” 
and pointed to the rigged frame (sadness trial). The experimenter waited for the child’s narrative 
response and prompted twice by repeating the question if the child did not respond. Children’s 
narrative responses to this question were transcribed and given a binary score for the presence 
(1) or absence (0) of children’s references to the fact that they themselves caused the 
transgression. Off-topic narratives were coded as a non-response (missing data).  
2.5.3.2.2 Who did it? 
Next, the experimenter queried, “Who did it?” and again used prompting if the child did not 
respond. Children who did not respond to this question after prompting were asked, “Was it me, 
was it you, or was it mom/dad?” Children’s responses to this question were transcribed and given 
a binary score corresponding to children indicating that they did it (1) or that someone else did it 
(0). Thus, responses that indicated that parent or the experimenter caused the transgression were 
grouped together. 
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2.5.3.2.3 Did you do it? 
Then the experimenter queried, “Did you do it? Yes, or no?” and again used prompting if 
the child did not respond. Children’s responses to this question were given a binary score 
corresponding to yes (1) or no (0). 
2.5.4 Debriefing.  
Children assigned to a condition involving the transgressor scripts were debriefed at the 
end of the study to minimize distress. The experimenter explained to the child that hurting the 
parent was not the child’s fault, and that the child did not break the frame, which frequently 
breaks. The experimenter then told the child that she would fix the frame, and returned with an 
intact frame to show to the child. Debriefing has been used successfully to reduce children’s 
distress in other studies that use a transgression paradigm (e.g., Kochanska et al., 1995).  
2.5.5 Scoring and Rating of Observational Data.  
Research assistants (RAs) who were blind to the study hypothesis scored or rated two 
measures of the children’s prosocial responding from videos. RAs began watching videos at the 
start of the test phase. Thus, RAs did not see whether or not the child watched the video. Scoring 
and rating procedures were identical in both trials (pain and sadness). 
2.5.5.1 Target acts (imitation). 
In all conditions, children’s production of the demonstrated prosocial act during the test 
phase was scored for each trial as a measure of imitation. Children received 1 point each for 
replicating 6 possible demonstrated actions with the prosocial item (see Appendix A). Scoring 
was designed to give children some credit for partial fulfillment of the target acts. A target acts 
33 
(imitation) score was calculated by summing points within trials and then averaging across the 
two trials. 
2.5.5.2 Conventional acts (goal emulation).  
Children’s attempts to relieve distress using other, non-demonstrated prosocial behaviors 
(e.g., hugging the parent, using statements of concern, apologizing) during the test phase were 
also rated for all conditions as a measure of goal emulation. The presence and intensity of these 
behaviors were rated on a 5-point scale (0= none, 4= strong) based on the systems used by 
Williamson, Donohue and Tully (2013) and Zahn-Waxler, Cole, Welsh and Fox (1995; See 
Appendix B). A conventional acts (goal emulation) rating was made for each trial, and trials 
were then averaged together. 
2.5.5.3 Distress 
The presence and intensity of distress (facial, vocal, or gestural/postural expressions of 
generalized distress including concern/anxiety/sadness/anger) were rated on a 5-point scale (0= 
none, 4= strong) based on the system used by Zahn-Waxler, Cole, Welsh and Fox (1995; See 
Appendix B). A distress rating was made for each trial, and trials were then averaged together. 
Children’s distress was coded in order to compare children’s distress in response to the 
transgressions in this study to their typical distress following transgressions (using the My-Child 
AD) as a third transgression check.  
2.5.6 Training and reliability of scorers/raters  
One team of two trained scorers scored children’s target acts (imitation) and a different 
trained rater rated the conventional acts (goal emulation). Raters trained by reading the manual 
and meeting with the primary investigator (PI), who served as the master rater, to discuss ratings 
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and examples and ask questions. The raters first watched a training video with the PI, who 
reviewed the rating (of target acts or conventional acts). Raters then watched and rated the initial 
training video on their own and met with the PI to review all ratings and reconcile any 
discrepancies. Next, raters were given one new training video at a time to rate independently. 
They met with the PI to discuss the ratings. After five videos were rated independently, initial 
inter-rater reliability was assessed with a two-way, mixed, absolute agreement intraclass 
correlation coefficient (ICC). This statistic is identical to using a weighted kappa with quadratic 
weights for ordinal scales, and the two can be used interchangeably (Norman & Streiner, 2008). 
Rating of videos continued until reliability of at least .75, considered in the excellent range 
(Cicchetti, 1994), was attained.  
Raters were then assigned 4 videos to rate at a time. After completing a set of videos, the 
raters met with the PI/master rater to review the ratings for one randomly selected video to 
minimize observer drift (i.e., the implicit change in code definitions made by observers over 
time; Kazdin, 1977; Smith, 1986). Again using an ICC, reliability for observer drift was 
calculated for the randomly selected 25% of each rater’s videos. Drift reliability was monitored 
to ensure that reliability of at least .75 was maintained. The PI served as the reliability rater for 
both initial reliability and drift reliability. ICCs for each scored or rated variable are presented in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Reliabilities (Intraclass Correlation Coefficients) for Scored or Rated Variables 
 Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 3 
Scored/Rated Variable Training Drift Training Drift Training Drift 
Target Acts (Imitation) .94 .97 .96 .99 - - 
Conventional Acts (Goal 
Emulation) 
    .88 .93 
Distress     .92 .85 
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2.5.7 Piloting participants.  
The study was piloted on a small group of children to test several particularly novel aspects 
of the design. The pilot used prosocial demonstration videos with 12 possible demonstrated 
actions with the prosocial item. The pilot tested a) children’s interest in the prosocial 
demonstration videos and b) examined whether the videos were too complex, or if children were 
able to imitate 12 possible actions. Piloting revealed that children’s interest in the prosocial 
demonstration videos was strong, but the videos appeared too complex; children who imitated 
the demonstrated video used far fewer than 12 actions; thus, new prosocial demonstration videos 
with only 6 possible actions were created and used for data collection as to not present 
demonstrations to children that were too complex to replicate. 
The pilot also tested aspects of the test phase. The pilot utilized a rigged bear during the 
sadness trial. However, the bear appeared to be causing too much distress in children (i.e., 
several children cried). Thus, a rigged frame was utilized instead and was piloted on additional 
children. Using the rigged frame resulted in far less distress in children (i.e., none of these pilot 
children cried); thus, the rigged frame was used in data collection. Piloting was also conducted to 
assess whether the transgressions appeared believable to children (e.g., whether children would 
laugh rather than display concern); no child laughed, and pilot children engaged in a variety of 
prosocial behaviors to help their parent, suggesting that the paradigm was believable to children. 
Piloting was also used to examine whether 60s was too lengthy for the test period, as our 
previous study used a 30s test period. As pilot children acted prosocially throughout the 60s test 
period, it was determined that this was an appropriate length for the paradigm.  
Finally, the pilot also examined the effectiveness of asking follow-up questions to parents 
and children to assess children’s understanding of the transgressions. The pilot utilized pictures 
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to facilitate children’s understanding of the child fault questions. For example, when the child 
was asked the question “who did it?” a picture with two adults and one child was used and the 
child was told that the pictures represented the experimenter, parent and child respectively. 
Children were able to point to a picture to indicate their answer. However, the pictures appeared 
to confuse children (e.g., children often gave verbal answers that conflicted with the picture that 
they pointed to); thus, they were not used in data collection. As parents and children appeared to 
largely understand and respond to the fault follow-up questions, these questions were retained for 
data collection. 
3 RESULTS 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Means, standard deviations, and ranges for study variables are presented in Table 3.  
Correlations among continuous variables are displayed in Table 4 and are discussed below. 
Descriptive information about categorical variables is also presented in the text below.  
As previously mentioned, this study employed two trials varying in emotional content in 
order to a) provide children with more than one opportunity to demonstrate target acts or 
conventional acts, b) increase generalizability of study findings to different emotional contexts 
and, c) decrease the chance that transgressions would be artificial to children (e.g., experiencing 
two feigned transgressions involving parent’s pain may appear more artificial than experiencing 
two more disparate transgressions). We used one total score for each outcome (target acts, or 
imitation; conventional acts, or goal emulation) that was created by averaging scores across pain 
and sadness trials. Overall, children’s behaviors as well as parents’ and children’s responses to 
follow-up questions on the pain trial were positively correlated with those of the sadness trial. 
This indicates that children’s and parent’s behaviors and responses were consistent across the 
37 
two trials, relative to other children and parents in the sample. Children’s conventional acts 
between pain and sadness trials were significantly and positively correlated, r = .75, p = .00, as 
was children’s distress between pain and sadness trials, r = .55, p = .00, supporting the creation 
of total scores. As children in the no-distress condition in which there was not a transgression to 
repair largely received a conventional acts rating of 0 and a distress rating of 0, their 
conventional acts and distress ratings may be driving associations involving these variables. To 
account for this possibility, correlations between pain and sadness trials for the conventional acts 
and distress variables were repeated on the subset of children in a condition that utilized the 
transgressor script (experimental and no-distress control conditions). The correlations remained 
positively and significantly correlated, r = .52, p = .00; r = .43, p = .01, respectively. Parent 
ratings of children’s perceived fault were significantly and positively correlated between pain 
and sadness trials, r = .40, p < .01. Similarly, children’s report of their perceived fault between 
pain and sadness trials was positively and significantly correlated, r = .40, p < .01. Children’s 
target acts scores were not significantly correlated between pain and sadness trials, r = -.05, p = 
.71, likely reflecting the fact that only 6 children produced any target acts, and each of these 
children did so on only one trial. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Primary Study Variables: Means, Standard Deviations, and 
Ranges 
 Possible 
Range 
Observed 
Range 
 Mean (SD) or Frequency  
   Overall 
Sample 
Experimental No-video 
control 
No-
distress 
control 
1. Age (% two 
years old) 
0-1 0-1 57.4% 50% 55.6% 66.7% 
2. Gender (% 
female) 
0-1 0-1 53.7% 55.6% 55.6% 50.0% 
3. Parent 
gender (% 
mothers) 
0-1 0-1 81.5% 88.9% 72.2% 83.3% 
4. My-Child 
AD 
18-126 37-102.71 77.70 
(13.78) 
74.31 
(11.68) 
75.76 
(16.20) 
83.72 
(11.75) 
5. Distress 0-4 0-3.5 1.42 (.87) 2.00 (.79) 1.61 (.63) .64 (.56) 
6. Parent fault 
question 
0-3 0-3 1.83 (.95) 2.36 (.51) 2.21 (.90) .88 (.63) 
7. Child fault 
question 
0-1 0-1 .63 (.38) .90 (.21) .80 (.27) .33 (.33) 
 
Table 4. Correlations among Continuous Study Variables 
 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
2. My-Child AD   -.14 -.31* .04 -.25 
3. Target Acts     .13 -.07 .10 
4. Conventional Acts     .47** .50** 
5. Distress     .53** 
6. Parent fault question      
 
3.1.1 Correlations among variables.  
Conventional acts scores were positively associated with My-Child AD scores and parent 
ratings of children’s perceived fault and negatively associated with children’s distress. Children’s 
distress was positively associated with parent ratings of children’s perceived fault. All 
correlations among study variables displayed in Table 4 were repeated on only children in a 
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condition that utilized the transgressor script (experimental and no-distress control conditions). 
Among children in these two conditions, only a correlation between children’s My-Child AD 
scores and their distress was significant, which will be discussed below (see Deception 
Manipulation Checks).  
3.1.2 Group differences among variables.  
Boys (M = 35.86, SD = 4.59) were older than girls (M = 33.17, SD = 2.77), t(51) = -
2.631, p = .01. Tests of differences in outcome variables by demographic variables and trial 
order were conducted in order to determine whether covariates should be included in tests of the 
study hypothesis. Independent samples t-tests did not reveal significant differences in target acts 
or conventional acts scores by categorical demographic characteristics (i.e., child gender, parent 
gender, child race, child age) or trial order. A series of t-tests were conducted to examine 
whether mean levels of target acts or conventional acts scores differed by these categorical 
demographic variables within any of the three conditions. No significant differences were found.  
Random assignment was expected to produce an equal distribution of pertinent 
demographic and dispositional variables across experimental conditions. Statistical tests were 
conducted to confirm this assumption. Restricted random assignment ensured a proportion of 
boys and girls that was not significantly different across experimental conditions. Chi-square 
tests using the Yates correction revealed that neither the number of paternal parent actors nor the 
number of children in each age group was significantly different across conditions. A one-way 
ANOVA revealed no significant effect of condition on My-Child AD scores such that children’s 
tendency to experience distress following transgressions was not significantly different across 
conditions.    
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In sum, there were no differences in target acts or conventional acts scores by relevant 
demographic variables or trial order. Thus, covariates were not included in the tests of the 
hypothesis. 
3.2 Deception Manipulation Checks.  
The three manipulation checks were analyzed to examine whether the transgressor script 
successfully led children to believe that they had transgressed.  
3.2.1 Parent’s ratings of children’s perceived fault. 
First, we tested whether parent’s report that their child believed they had transgressed 
during the test phase differed depending on condition. Assumptions of ANOVA were tested. 
There were no outliers in the data, as assessed by no cases with standardized residuals greater 
than ±3 standard deviations. Ratings were not normally distributed for the no-distress control 
condition, D(17) = .25, p = .01, the no-video control condition, D(17) = .22, p = .03, or the 
experimental condition, D(18) = .27, p = .00, as assessed by the Kolmorgorov-Smirnov test of 
normality. Following the recommendations of Levine and Dunlap (1982), square root, 
logarithmic, and inverse transformations were attempted, as transformations may correct skew. 
The distributions were still significantly different from normal following transformations. Thus, 
a non-transformed variable was used in subsequent analyses. The assumption of homogeneity of 
variances was violated, as assessed by Levene's Test of Homogeneity of Variance F(2,49) = 
4.57, p = .02. As assumptions of ANOVA were violated, a nonparametric test, the Kruskal-
Wallis H Test was used. Nonparametric strategies are recommended when ANOVA assumptions 
are violated, as these statistics can increase power, are less sensitive to the degree of sample 
normality and may also be used for outlier-prone distributions (Lantz, 2013; Zimmerman, 2001). 
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Parent ratings of children’s perceived fault were significantly different among conditions, 
χ2(2) = 24.11, p < .01. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure 
with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. This post hoc analysis confirmed 
statistically significant differences in ratings between the no-distress control (mean rank = 11.34) 
and experimental (mean rank = 33.66; p = .000) conditions, and no-distress control and no-video 
control (mean rank = 32.76; p = .000) conditions, but not between the experimental and no-video 
control conditions. This result indicates that parents of children in a condition in which a 
transgression occurred provided significantly higher ratings that their children believed they 
were at fault than parents of children in the no-distress control condition in which a transgression 
did not occur. 
3.2.2 Children’s report of their perceived fault. 
Second, we tested whether children’s report of their perceived fault differed depending 
on condition. Children’s own report of whether or not they had transgressed was more difficult to 
examine, as there was a large amount of missing data on these questions due to children’s 
inability or unwillingness to answer the questions, or because the experimenter did not ask the 
questions if children were crying or tearing up following the transgressions. Table 5 displays the 
pattern of missingness, which was similar between pain and sadness trials. Table 6 displays 
frequencies of children who indicated fault among participants with valid data. The large amount 
of missing data made computing an average score of children’s responses to the three child 
questions less than ideal. Thus, one representative question was selected to include in analyses. 
The fault question with the least amount of missing data, “Did you do it?” was selected. 
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Table 5. Percent Missingness on Children's Fault Questions 
 Percent Missing 
 
Overall Sample Experimental No-video control No-distress control 
Pain Trial     
1. What happened? 48.1% 44.4% 33.3% 66.7% 
2. Who did it? 35.2% 38.9% 44.4% 22.2% 
3. Did you do it? 16.7% 22.2% 11.1% 16.7% 
Sadness Trial     
4. What happened? 40.7% 44.4% 38.9% 38.9% 
5. Who did it?  35.2% 33.3% 44.4% 27.8% 
6. Did you do it? 18.5% 22.2% 27.8% 5.6% 
     
 
Table 6. Number and Percent of Children Indicating Fault on Children's Fault Questions 
 Percent 
 
Overall Sample Experimental No-video control No-distress control 
 n % n % n % n % 
Pain Trial         
1. What happened? 14 50% 6 60.0% 7 58.3% 1 16.7% 
2. Who did it? 23 65.7% 10 90.9% 7 70.0% 6 42.9% 
3. Did you do it? 34 75.6% 11 78.6% 13 81.3% 10 66.7% 
Sadness Trial         
4. What happened? 7 21.9% 3 30.0% 4 36.4% 0 0% 
5. Who did it?  17 48.6% 9 75.0% 5 50.0% 3 23.1% 
6. Did you do it? 26 59.1% 10 71.4% 9 69.2% 7 41.2% 
 
Analyses were conducted to determine whether children with missing data on the selected 
fault question differed significantly from children with valid data on any relevant dispositional 
(My-Child) demographic (age, child gender, parent gender) or study variables (target acts, 
conventional acts, distress). Only one significant difference emerged; more boys than girls had 
missing data on this question, χ2(2) = 6.46, p = .01. The number of children with valid data (n = 
41) was evenly distributed across experimental conditions. 
43 
Chi square analyses using a 3x3 contingency table and the Yates correction revealed no 
significant effect of condition on children’s report of their perceived fault1, χ2(2) = 6.62, p = .35. 
This result indicates that children in a condition in which they were made to believe they 
transgressed did not report significantly more fault than children in the no-distress control 
condition in which a transgression did not occur. 
3.2.3 My-Child AD Scale and children’s rated distress. 
One final manipulation check involved comparing parent’s report of children’s typical 
displays of distress following transgressions to children’s rated distress during the transgression 
paradigm. This analysis examined whether the laboratory transgression elicited affective 
reactions in children similar to their typical distress following transgressions. Thus, only children 
in one of the two conditions involving a transgression (experimental, no-video control) were 
included in the analyses. The My-Child AD scale was positively and significantly correlated with 
children’s rated distress during the study paradigm, r = .40, p = .02.  
3.3 Tests of Study Hypothesis. 
Tests of the hypotheses involved examining the effect of condition on target acts scores 
and conventional acts ratings (Figure 3).  
3.3.1 Target acts.  
First, condition differences in target acts scores were examined to investigate children’s 
imitation of the demonstrated prosocial behaviors using the novel prosocial objects. Assumptions 
of ANOVA were tested. Target acts scores were not normally distributed for the no-distress 
control condition condition, D(18) = .51, p = .00, the no-video control condition, D(18) = .54, p 
                                                 
1 Chi square analyses were conducted on each of the other two child questions and also revealed no significant effect 
of condition on children’s report of their perceived fault. 
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= .00, or the experimental condition, D(18) = .48, p = .00, as assessed by the Kolmorgorov-
Smirnov test of normality. Square root, logarithmic, and inverse transformations on the target 
acts dependent variable were attempted. The distributions were still significantly different from 
normal following transformations. Thus, a non-transformed dependent variable was used in 
subsequent analyses. There were several (n = 6) outliers in the data (3 in the experimental 
condition, 2 in the no-distress control condition, and 1 in the no-video control condition), as 
assessed by cases with standardized residuals greater than ±3 standard deviations. However, as 
these outliers represent genuine data points (e.g., the only five children who produced any target 
acts), there is no reason to reject them as invalid; thus, they were not removed. There was 
homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity of variance, F(2,51) = 
2.22, p = .12). As assumptions of ANOVA were violated, the Kruskal-Wallis H Test was used. 
The test revealed no significant effect of condition (experimental, no-video control, no-distress 
control) on the target acts score2, χ2(2) = 1.12, p = .571, η2 = .02. Table 7 displays the number of 
children in each experimental condition who displayed any target acts (i.e., received above a 
score of 0).  
Table 7. Number of Children who Produced Target Acts 
 Overall Sample Experimental No-video control No-distress control 
Pain Trial 3 2 1 0 
Sadness Trial 3 1 0 2 
 
3.3.2 Conventional acts.  
Second, the conventional acts ratings were examined to investigate children’s use of 
other, non-demonstrated prosocial acts during the test phase. Assumptions of ANOVA were 
                                                 
2 Analyses conducted on the pain and sadness trials separately revealed the same findings.  
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tested. Conventional acts ratings were normally distributed for the for the experimental 
condition, D(18) = .16, p = .20, and the no-video control condition, D(18) = .11, p = .20, but not 
the no-distress control condition, D(18) = .52, p = .00, as assessed by the Kolmorgorov-Smirnov 
test of normality. Square root, logarithmic, and inverse transformations on the conventional acts 
dependent variable were attempted. The distribution of the no-distress control condition 
remained significantly different from normal following transformations. Thus, a non-transformed 
dependent variable was used in subsequent analyses.  There were no outliers in the data, as 
assessed by no cases with standardized residuals greater than ±3 standard deviations. There was 
not homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity of variance, F(2,51) 
= 14.23, p < .01. As assumptions of ANOVA were violated, the Kruskal-Wallis H Test was used.  
The mean rank of conventional acts ratings was statistically significantly different 
between conditions3, χ2(2) = 31.96, p < .001, η2 = .60. Pairwise comparisons were performed 
using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. This post 
hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in conventional acts ratings between the 
experimental (mean rank = 38.98; p < .001) and no-distress control (mean rank = 10.78) 
conditions, and no-video control (mean rank = 36.76; p < .001) and no-distress control 
conditions, but not between the experimental and no-video control conditions. Thus, children in a 
condition involving the transgressor script engaged in significantly greater conventional acts than 
children in the no-distress control condition. 
                                                 
3 Analyses conducted on the pain and sadness trials separately revealed the same findings 
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Figure 3. Mean (±SE) target acts scores (A) and mean (±SE) conventional acts ratings (B) as a 
function of experimental condition. *p<.05. 
 
4 DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the current study was to investigate children’s social learning of prosocial 
behaviors for use in a transgressor context using a novel methodology in which children were led 
to believe that they had caused their parent’s pain and sadness. While our previous work 
demonstrated that children can learn a prosocial behavior to help another in pain through 
imitating and emulating the goal of the model’s example (Williamson et al., 2013), no previous 
study had investigated children’s social learning of prosocial behaviors when children have 
transgressed to cause another’s distress. Children in this study who were led to believe that they 
had transgressed to cause their parent’s distress engaged in significantly more frequent and 
sophisticated non-demonstrated prosocial behaviors than children who witnessed their parent 
engage in a neutral activity. However, we found no evidence supporting children’s ability to 
imitate the novel helping behaviors in the transgressor context, and there was no evidence of goal 
* 
* 
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emulation (achieving the goal of the prosocial demonstration—alleviating a victim’s distress) as 
children’s use of previously learned prosocial behaviors to help a distressed parent did not differ 
significantly depending on whether or not they first watched the prosocial demonstration video. 
Before interpreting the primary analysis, findings related to the study design are discussed.  
4.1 Validity of the transgression paradigm.  
Three manipulation checks were used to establish the ecological validity of the 
transgression paradigm in the laboratory. First, children who tend to be more distressed 
following transgressions in naturalistic settings (assessed by parent report) also displayed more 
distress affect during the transgression paradigm. Second, parents of transgressor children made 
significantly higher ratings of children’s perceived fault than parents of children who were not 
led to believe that they had transgressed. Third, transgressor children themselves were no more 
likely to report fault than children who were not led to believe that they had transgressed; 
however, children may not be accurate reporters of their personal responsibility for 
transgressions. Children’s shame following transgressions is associated with their avoidance and 
denial of fault (Barrett et. al., 1993); thus, it is likely that some transgressor children did not 
respond to fault questions or reported that they were not at fault due to avoidance and denial 
rather than failure to understand their responsibility for the transgression.  
The current study provides indications that children believed that they were at fault for 
the transgressions. Utilizing manipulation checks such as parent report was novel, as previous 
studies have tended to simply assumed children’s understanding of fault (Barrett et al., 1993; 
Cole et al., 1992; Kochanska et al., 1995, 2002). Understanding fault is a challenging 
developmental task, as studies suggest that toddlers are at times confused about whether or not 
they caused another’s distress in the context of complex interpersonal interactions (Zahn-Waxler 
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& Radke-Yarrow, 1990). However, toddlers possess the cognitive ability to understand when 
they are at fault, as children understand intentionality and their role as causal agents by age two 
(Kagan, 1984; Piaget & Cook, 1952; Stipek, Gralinski, & Kopp, 1990). Therefore, studies that 
utilize paradigms in which children’s transgression is experimentally manipulated should test 
rather than assume children’s understanding of fault.   
4.2 No effect of condition on children’s imitation or goal emulation.  
Contrary to expectations, children who saw the prosocial demonstration video and were 
led to believe they transgressed were not more likely than children in either control condition to 
replicate the demonstrated novel helping behavior. Thus, children in this study did not imitate a 
prosocial demonstration in a transgressor context. This surprising lack of effect suggests that it is 
markedly difficult for children to imitate a prosocial behavior when they have transgressed to 
cause another’s distress. Children who were led to believe they transgressed were significantly 
more likely to engage in previously learned prosocial behaviors than children who did not 
transgress but witnessed their parent engage in a neutral activity. However, among transgressor 
children, ratings of previously learned prosocial behaviors were not significantly different 
depending on whether or not the child watched the video; thus, there was no evidence of goal 
emulation, as the demonstration of a novel helping behavior did not encourage more previously 
learned prosocial behaviors than what children produced at baseline.  
These lack of differences suggest that modeling was not an effective means for 
promoting children’s newly or previously learned prosocial behaviors in a transgressor context; 
instead, other practices may be more effective. Mother’s use of inductive reasoning and an 
authoritative parenting style have been associated with children’s increased reparative prosocial 
responding (Kochanska, 1991; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979). Studies have found associations 
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between increased altruistic prosocial behaviors and several additional socialization processes, 
such as secure early attachment, maternal sensitivity and responsiveness and emotion 
socialization practices (e.g., Brownell et al., 2013; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Kiang et al., 2004). 
Studies should examine whether these socialization processes are also related to children’s 
greater use of reparative prosocial behaviors. Further, the current study is the only study to test a 
causal mechanism for learning reparative prosocial behaviors; experimental designs should be 
employed to test other potential causal mechanisms. Mechanisms that do not necessarily involve 
socialization may also be implicated; for example, fostering children’s better emotion regulation 
during distressing transgressions may facilitate their reparative responding.  
While we anticipated that children’s imitation and emulation of the goal of a prosocial 
behavior might be more difficult in a transgressor context, the extremely low rates of children’s 
imitation were unexpected given the large effect size (f=.766) of children’s prosocial imitation in 
a bystander context in our previous, published study (Williamson et. al, 2013). Children’s 
engagement in previously learned prosocial acts in the current study was frequent and 
sophisticated; in fact, we modified the coding system used in our published study (e.g., to a 5 
versus 3 point scale with stricter thresholds per code) as it was clear that children were engaging 
in more frequent and sophisticated non-demonstrated prosocial behaviors in the transgressor 
context. The high rates and sophisticated use of previously learned prosocial behaviors was 
unexpected given that most research has demonstrated that children are less prosocial as 
transgressors than as bystanders (Dunn & Brown, 1994; Dunn & Munn, 1986; Zahn-Waxler et 
al., 1979; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, et al., 1992). This research has solely compared rates of 
children’s prosocial responding to peers between bystander and transgressor contexts; children 
may be more motivated to repair a transgression involving a parent’s rather than a peer’s distress 
50 
given the central role that parents occupy in young children’s worlds as well as research 
indicating that distress in parents is often upsetting to children (Cummings, Iannotti, & Zahn-
Waxler, 1985; Solantaus-Simula, Punamäki, & Beardslee, 2002). 
Children often experience guilt and shame as transgressors (Kochanska et al., 2002), and 
the distress children experienced in this study likely included these self-conscious emotions 
among other distress emotions. Self-conscious emotions may have motivated children’s use of 
previously learned prosocial behaviors while simultaneously interfering with their use of newly 
learned prosocial behaviors. Guilt, which is thought to motivate children’s reparative responding 
(Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990), may have motivated children to act prosocially using 
previously learned prosocial behaviors. While shame-relevant behaviors such as avoidance, 
withdrawal, and denial may inhibit young children’s ability to act prosocially in a transgressor 
context (Barrett, Zahn-Waxler & Cole, 1993), children’s impressive engagement in previously 
learned prosocial behaviors suggests that children were largely engaged with their parent rather 
than in avoidance or withdrawal. At the same time, it is possible that self-conscious emotions 
overwhelmed children such that they were unable to imitate a newly learned prosocial act. 
Reproducing novel acts through imitation is more cognitive taxing than is utilizing previously 
learned behaviors (Killen & Uzgiris, 1981; Masur & Ritz, 1984; McCabe & Uzgiris, 1983) and 
may thus be more vulnerable to the interference of strong emotions. The current study utilized a 
deferred (rather than immediate) imitation task that was particularly cognitively demanding as it 
involved both learning and nonverbal memory (Meltzoff, 1988). Self-conscious emotions or 
children’s more generalized experience of stress (i.e., emotional and physiological reactions to 
aversive stimuli; Storbeck & Clore, 2014) during the paradigm may have impacted the process of 
retrieving the newly learned prosocial skill from memory. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests 
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that stress during both consolidation and retrieval impairs memory performance (Smeets, Otgaar, 
Candel, & Wolf, 2008; Trammell & Clore, 2015). While there was no relationship between rated 
distress and imitation, it is possible that some children experienced internal distress that was not 
observable in facial expressions or nonverbal behavior, and was thus not captured by our distress 
coding.  
The transgression paradigm elicited both high levels of engagement in previously learned 
prosocial behaviors as well as high levels of distress. Thus, it appears that a context in which 
children believe they caused a parent’s pain or sadness is a “high stakes” situation. The most 
fitting explanation for the data may be that when the stakes are high, children fall back on 
previously learned, previously successful behaviors rather than attempting a newly learned 
behavior. In other words, children may have used tried and true strategies rather than a riskier 
newly learned strategy to repair the all-important parent-child relationship. Children’s 
willingness to act prosocially depends on their degree of self-efficacy, or belief in their ability to 
help (Bandura, 1977). Children may be more confident in their ability to competently use 
previously effective, rather than new prosocial strategies—especially in contexts in which 
successfully relieving distress feels particularly imperative.  
Changes in methodology from our previous study (Williamson et. al, 2013) may also 
partially explain the lack of imitation in the transgressor context. First, in contrast to the previous 
study, the current study required children to generalize slightly from the video demonstration to 
the mishap. For example, during the pain trial, children watched a video demonstration of a hurt 
hand, and the parent subsequently simulated a hurt finger. It is possible that toddlers are unable 
to imitate a prosocial skill in a situation that is not an exact match to that of the demonstration. 
However, as the mishaps differed only slightly from the demonstrations, it does not seem likely 
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that this explanation alone can account for the difference in effects across the two studies. 
Second, in contrast to the previous study, the transgressions involved items (e.g., the pounding 
toy and picture frame) which may have distracted children. However, this explanation also seems 
unlikely as the majority of children stopped playing with the items in order to tend to their 
parent’s distress—they simply typically did so using previously learned prosocial behaviors.  
In sum, the stark contrast of children’s low rates of prosocial imitation in a transgressor 
context to their high rates in a bystander context (Williamson et al., 2013) provides evidence that 
a transgressor context is clearly distinct from a bystander context and may be developmentally 
important. Indeed, whether or not children are at fault for causing a victim’s distress appears to 
greatly impact children’s learning, behaviors, and perhaps their emotions. Existing studies have 
tended to make claims about both reparative and altruistic prosocial behaviors based on designs 
that almost exclusively examine children’s prosocial responding in bystander contexts. The 
current study suggests that investigations must specifically examine children’s responses to 
transgression rather than assuming that findings from bystander contexts will generalize to 
transgressor contexts. Finally, the data points to a need to elucidate possible reasons that 
applying a newly learned prosocial behavior appears strikingly difficult for children in a 
transgressor context. In particular, the shame and guilt that such transgressions often cause may 
create a high stakes, emotionally laden context that also makes applying newly learned behaviors 
difficult.  
4.3 Summary 
The current study presents a novel and valid paradigm through which children’s 
responses to transgressions against their parent were examined. We found no indication that 
children are able to imitate a prosocial demonstration when they are led to believe that they have 
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caused their parent’s distress. Instead, children engaged in other, non-demonstrated prosocial 
behaviors. Seeing a prosocial demonstration did not increase children’s use of these previously 
learned prosocial behaviors above baseline, suggesting that there was also no evidence of 
children’s emulation of the goal of a prosocial demonstration in this transgressor context.  
4.4 Limitations 
Several limitations of the study should be noted. It is always possible that laboratory 
paradigms may appear artificial to some children; however, children’s behavioral and affective 
responses to the paradigm suggests that it was realistic to the majority of children. Similarly, 
children watched the video demonstration and then immediately encountered a parent in distress; 
it is unlikely that children have opportunities to display prosocial behaviors immediately 
following modeled prosocial demonstrations in the natural environment. While utilizing strange 
novel acts was necessary in order to measure new learning, it is possible that children may have 
been more able to utilize novel prosocial behaviors if these demonstrated acts had more face 
validity as a means of helping (e.g., were less strange). Children were assessed at one time point 
only, leaving questions about children’s imitation and goal emulation after repeated exposure to 
prosocial demonstrations, which is how learning typically occurs in the natural environment, that 
cannot be answered by the current study. The PI served as the master coder for the outcome 
variables; using a master coder who was blind to study hypotheses may have decreased the 
likelihood of bias in coding. Similarly, raters could not be completely blind to condition, as the 
content of the coded test period differed depending on condition (i.e., one condition involved a 
neutral interaction rather than transgressions). Results from children’s report of their perceived 
fault included a large amount of missing data and likely tapped constructs such as guilt and 
shame rather than children’s understanding of fault; future studies should design a different self-
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report measure. Finally, the sample was predominantly Caucasian and parents were, on average, 
highly educated. Studies with samples of differing demographic characteristics will be important 
for understanding the generalizability of the current study’s lack of effect.  
4.5 Future directions.  
This study indicates several directions for future research. Future studies should directly 
compare children’s social learning of a prosocial behavior in a transgressor versus a bystander 
context using items during the test period as well as videos that require children to generalize 
from the video to the transgression paradigm. Such investigations will elucidate whether 
methodological differences between the current study and our previous, published study 
contributed to the disparate findings or if children can imitate and emulate the goal of a prosocial 
demonstration in a bystander but not a transgressor context. Studies should examine whether 
children will imitate a prosocial demonstration in a transgressor context after viewing the 
demonstration multiple times, which may increase children’s confidence in the effectiveness of 
the novel behavior.  
The focus of the study was behavioral and did not aim to study children’s affective 
responses to the transgressions. However, the transgression paradigm evoked emotional 
responses akin to those elicited by children’s everyday transgressions; thus, this paradigm should 
be used to answer questions about children’s emotions following transgression. First, while there 
was no association between children’s distress and their prosocial behaviors, future studies 
should examine this relationship in larger samples and using both behavioral and 
psychophysiological measures of children’s reactivity to uncover any present associations. Such 
studies would enable an examination of the impact of distress on children’s learning of and 
memory for a new skill as well as children’s use of previously learned prosocial behaviors. 
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Quadratic associations between children’s distress and their prosocial behaviors should be 
examined, as distress may be optimally motivating at moderate levels, and studies should 
distinguish between distinct types of distress, such as empathic versus personal (e.g., self-
oriented) distress responses. Second, studies should examine the potential role of guilt and shame 
in a) impairing children’s prosocial imitation and/or b) motivating children’s use of previously 
learned prosocial behaviors in a transgressor context. Finally, the practical importance of this 
research centers on findings indicating that chronic, unalleviated guilt is associated with greater 
depressive symptoms in very young children, and that reparative behaviors help alleviate guilt. 
Thus, future studies should examine associations between children’s maladaptive guilt and 
shame and reparative behaviors following transgressions and children’s internalizing problems, 
both concurrently and over time. 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A: Target Acts Coding Manual 
Child receives 1 point for performing each of the following actions. If a child attempts an action 
but cannot execute it correctly, the child receives partial credit for the action. For example, if it 
appears that the child is trying to put on the cleaning mitt but is physically unable to do so, the 
child would get credit for this attempt as well as subsequent actions (e.g., patting the parent’s 
head while holding the mitt in hand).  
Score each of the following actions with: 0= not present/no attempt, 0.5= unsuccessful attempt, 
1= successful attempt.  
 
Cleaning mitt demonstration (physical pain trial): 
1. Intentionally touches parent with mitt 
2. Touches parent with mitt using patting action 
-If the child touches the parent with the mitt, count it as the pat. The action in the video 
demonstration that they are imitating is a very slow pat, so it looks like alternating 
touches. 
-The “touches parent with mitt using patting action” and “touches parent with duster 
using running action” are meant to weed out children who are aggressive with the mitt 
(e.g., hitting). Be liberal about what counts as a pat or a run. If it’s close, count it. 
3. Touches parent with mitt on correct body part (head) 
4.  Touches parent in an alternating fashion (palm up and palm down) 
-For determining whether the child “flips” the mitt, focus on whether the child flips their 
hand rather than on which side of the mitt touches the parent. 
-Child gets credit even if it’s only one flip (not multiple like the demonstration video) 
5. Uses any vocalization while touching parent with mitt 
-Remember that the child must say the vocalization while touching the parent. 
-Remember NOT to count the child speaking words as a vocalization (the other coding 
team is responsible for this). 
6. Uses the correct vocalization (“eee, eee”) while touching parent with mitt 
-We will give the child a point if they use the correct (or very nearly correct) vocalization 
even one time. Be careful to listen to what the vocalization really is. If it is not the exact 
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vocalization and it seems consistent with other noises in the 1 minute clip, it might not be 
counted. 
-Child gets credit if only make vocalization once 
 
Blind duster demonstration (sadness trial): 
1. Intentionally touches parent with duster 
2. Touches parent with duster using running action 
-The “touches parent with mitt using patting action” and “touches parent with duster 
using running action” are meant to weed out children who are aggressive with the mitt/ 
duster (e.g., hitting). Be liberal about what counts as a pat or a run. If it’s close, count it. 
3.  Touches parent with duster on correct body part (arm) 
4.  Touches parent with duster down alternating arms of parent (left and right) 
5. Uses any vocalization while touching parent with duster 
-Remember that the child must say the vocalization while touching the parent. 
-Remember NOT to count the child speaking words as a vocalization (the other coding 
team is responsible for this). 
6. Uses the correct vocalization (“ahh, ahh”) while touching parent with duster 
-We will give the child a point if they use the correct (or very nearly correct) vocalization 
even one time. Be careful to listen to what the vocalization really is. If it is not the exact 
vocalization and it seems consistent with other noises in the 1 minute clip, it might not be 
counted. 
 
Notes: 
1. Remember to be careful about coding the exact minute of the tape listed. The child might 
do something with the item one second after the time period has ended, and we don’t 
want to code that (and we don’t want some of us coding it and some of us not, it will 
make us unreliable) 
2. Remember that a score of .5 means the child attempted an action but was physically 
unable (e.g., physically unable to put hand inside mitt, looks like is clearly intending to 
touch parent’s head (or arm) but cannot reach) 
3. A child simply handing the mitt or duster to the parent should NOT be counted as 
intentionally touching parent. Intentionally touching parent code is intended to indicate 
that the child acted on the parent (e.g., they used the item on the parent). The other 
coding team will handle coding children simply handing the items to the parent. 
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Steps for coding videos: 
1. Open your individual coding sheet (password protected). This contains your video 
assignments and is also where you will record and save your ratings. 
2. First, watch “full view” video for the folder you are working on. This will give you a 
sense of whether the child acted on the parent at all.  
3. Make any ratings you could see from watching the full video. Write any notes about 
anything that impeded your ability to code or any questions you have for meetings in the 
spaces provided on the coding sheet. 
4. Watch “big view” and make additional ratings based on anything new you could see from 
this view. Repeat this for “small view.” 
5. Please note that you may need to watch videos multiple times to get an accurate rating for 
the videos. Remember that we are aiming to be as detailed as possible and come up with 
the exact same ratings as one another. 
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Appendix B: Conventional Acts Coding Manual 
Coding steps: 
1. Rate the overall quality of all of the child's prosocial behaviors using “Prosocial 
Behaviors” coding, page 2. This should be a global rating of your overall impression 
of how prosocial the child was during the entire interaction. 
 
2. Rate the child’s overall distress during the entire interaction using “Distress Coding,” 
page 6. 
 
Prosocial Behaviors Coding – efforts to help or comfort parent or to provide resources to 
parent. Behaviors should have a prosocial intent.  
• Examples of prosocial behaviors include: 
o Apology   
Statement of sorrow for wrongdoing. 
e.g., "I'm sorry," "Didn't mean to" 
o Confession  
Admission of responsibility for wrongdoing.  
e.g., "I hurt your finger," "I broke your present" 
o Comforting/reassuring statements 
Statements to comfort or reassure the parent. 
e.g., "You're all better" “I love you” 
Children often make verbalizations while helping or giving physical 
affection (e.g., they often say, “I’ll fix it” or “I’ll kiss it”) 
o Information seeking questions 
Questions seeking information about parent's distressed state/feelings. 
e.g., "Are you ok?" "You're very sad?" 
o Physical affection  
Child attempts to soothe parent through physical affection. 
e.g., hugging, kissing, or patting any part of parent 
Note: Child may touch parent with an item such as the hammer as an 
unsophisticated method of physical touch.  
o Helping/repair attempts 
BEHAVIORS 
-Child attempts to repair either hurt finger or broken frame (i.e., not the 
parent’s feelings about the hurt finger or broken frame) typically 
accompanied by action.  
e.g., for blocks trial - attempting to retrieve bandaid 
e.g., for frame trial- attempts to fix frame; shows repaired item to parent 
VERBAL 
-Could also be a verbal suggestion of how to help. You should get the 
sense that the repair attempt is being made to help the parent (and not, for 
example, just a preoccupation with a broken object). 
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e.g., asking if parent needs a bandaid, asking to see parent’s finger, 
suggesting that the parent fix the frame or rub her own finger. These are 
typically considered somewhat less sophisticated because child could act 
to try to help and is choosing to talk about it instead. 
-Child may make some verbal statements about the novel objects (mitt & 
duster).  
e.g., “This will make you feel better.” (in reference to the item) “Just pat 
on your head with this” 
o Hands novel object to parent 
Child hands the green mitt or blue blind cleaner to parent, or otherwise 
gives it to parent (e.g., puts it in her lap). You will assess whether or not 
this action has prosocial intent. 
o Other behaviors 
Child’s behaviors that do not fall within a listed category.  
-Some of these I’ve seen include: attempts to distract the parent, attempts 
to make parent laugh, aggressive behaviors 
 
• Note about the child’s use of prosocial object (mitt or blind cleaner): 
o Do NOT include child’s use of the object to act ON parent when making prosocial 
rating. 
o Include any verbal statements made by the child while acting on parent with the 
object when making your rating, as well as verbal statements made by child about 
the prosocial object helping the parent. 
(e.g., “This will make you feel better.” “Just pat on your head with this”)  
How to make your rating: 
Factors to consider: 
o Throughout what percentage of the interaction is the child prosocial? 
-Consider both frequency of behaviors (how many times does the child act) as 
well as duration of behaviors (when child acts, how long does each behavior 
last?).  
-Consider frequency and duration together. The child does not need to have both 
in order to be acting throughout the majority of the interaction. (For example, the 
child may do one, long drawn out helping behavior which might rate just as 
highly as multiple, shorter behaviors).    
o Sophistication of behaviors 
-i.e., Are child's prosocial attempts advanced? Does the child's behavior display 
good understanding of parent's distress and what they can do to help? 
-Consider the variety of behaviors used by the child. Using a variety of behaviors 
should help increase your mental rating of sophistication. For example, you may 
get the sense that child is trying different behaviors to see if one will "work" (for 
example, after making an attempt and seeing that parent is still distressed, child 
tries a novel behavior); however, child's attempts may be sophisticated without 
using a variety of behaviors.  
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(Typically, using a variety of behaviors will mean that you’ll increase your idea of 
how sophisticated the child is, but there may be instances where child can gain a 
sophisticated rating without variety.) 
-To help you make a decision between ratings: Consider whether child is  
-A) focusing on mom while engaging in prosocial behaviors (more sophisticated) 
or not focusing on mom while engaging in prosocial behaviors (e.g., hammering, 
occupying self- less prosocial) 
-B) seems concerned for mom, or concerned in relieving own self-distress while 
acting 
-C) If all else fails, choose higher rating 
-If you are between two ratings, weigh sophistication more highly than 
frequency/duration in order to determine which rating the child should receive. 
  
Use the following scale to make your rating: 
0 = none 
1 = minimal or unclear 
2 = somewhat  
3 = moderate  
4 = strong  
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Prosocial Behaviors Chart 
Please use the chart below to help you make your overall prosocial behaviors rating.  
-You do not have to rely strictly on this chart. your rating should be your overall impression 
rather than a mathematical calculation. 
-Most children will not earn the same rating in each of the three categories. For example, an ideal 
‘3’ would mean that the child used more than one clear behaviors throughout the majority of the 
interaction and the quality of the prosocial actions was moderately sophisticated. However, it is 
unlikely that all children receiving a 3 will fit this ideal example exactly (for example, if their 
duration is a 2, you might still give them a 3 overall if their behaviors were moderately 
sophisticated). Focus on giving a rating for each category that fits the child best. 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 
Frequency 
of Behaviors 
No 
Behaviors 
1+ 
category. 
1+ 
behaviors 
per 
category. 
2+ 
category. 
1+ 
behaviors 
per 
category.  
OR 
1+category. 
2+behavior
s per 
category. 
2+ 
categories. 
3+ 
behaviors 
per 
category. 
 
3+ 
categories. 
3+ 
behaviors 
per 
category. 
Sophisticati
on of 
Behaviors 
Absent 
Unsophistic
ated or 
unclear 
whether 
truly 
prosocial  
Somewhat 
sophisticate
d 
Moderately 
sophisticate
d 
Strongly 
sophisticate
d 
Duration of 
Behaviors Absent 
Brief 
Display  
Sustained 
more than 
briefly 
Sustained 
throughout 
most of the 
interaction 
Sustained 
throughout 
almost the 
entire 
interaction 
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• Factors to consider: 
o Frequency of distress 
i.e., How many times is there a clear sign of distress? 
Distress Coding – expressions of distress. Consider facial, vocal, or gestural/postural 
expressions. Distress may present as different emotions in different children (e.g., one child's 
distress appears mostly sad, another's looks like anxiety, etc.) Examples of emotions may include 
concern/anxiety/sadness/anger.  
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o Duration of behaviors 
i.e., Throughout what percentage of the interaction is the child distressed? 
o Intensity of distress 
i.e., Is the distress slight, mild, moderate or extreme (crying)? 
If you’re having trouble making a choice, you may weight intensity more highly 
than frequency/duration. 
 
Coding Steps: 
1. Rate the child's overall distress throughout the entire interaction using this scale: 
0 = absent 
1 = minimal or unclear 
> fleeting sobering of expression and/or vocalization with slight evidence of 
distress; change in expression/vocalization but unsure whether distressed 
2 = somewhat  
> more than brief sobering of expression and/or vocalization with evidence that 
child is mildly distressed 
3 = moderate  
> sobering of expression and/or vocalization sustained throughout the interaction 
with moderate evidence of distress; may include whimpers, but does not have to 
(if there’s whimpering or tearing up, give them a 3) 
 
4 = substantial  
> sobering of expression and/or vocalization sustained throughout majority of the 
interaction with extreme evidence of distress; typically includes full blown crying 
(if there’s crying, give them a 4) 
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Distress Rating Chart 
Please use the chart below to help you make a distress rating. You do not have to rely strictly on 
this chart. your rating should be your overall impression rather than a mathematical calculation, 
but you may use the chart below to help you make a rating. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the coding manuals used in Williamson, Donohue, and Tully (2013) and  Zahn-Waxler, 
Cole, Welsh, and Fox (1995).  
 0 1 2 3 4 
Frequency 
of Affect 
No Sign of 
Distress 
At Least One 
Subtle Sign 
of Distress 
At Least One 
Clear Sign of 
Distress 
More than 
One Clear 
Sign 
Many clear 
signs 
Intensity 
of Affect 
No Hint of 
Distress 
Slight 
Display of 
Distress 
Mild display 
of distressed 
Moderate 
Display of 
Distress 
Extreme 
display of 
distress 
Duration 
of Affect 
Absent 
Fleeting 
Display  
Sustained 
more than 
briefly (just 
intermittently) 
Sustained 
throughout 
interaction 
Sustained 
throughout 
majority of 
interaction 
